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NOTES AND COMMENTS
to unanswered oral statements. 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940)
§§ 1071, 1073 (3). The general rule seems to be that an unanswered
letter which is not part of a mutual correspondence is not admissible
in favor of the writer as evidence of the statements contained therein.
Leach and Co. v. Pierson, 275 U.S. 120, 128, 55 A. L. R. 457, 459 (1927) ;
Morris v. Norton, 75 Fed. 912, 924, 925 (C. C. A. 6th, 1896); Packer
v. United States, 106 Fed. 906, 908 to 910 (C. C. A. 2d, 1901);
Snead v. Commonwealth, 138 Va. 787, 797, 798, 121 S. E. 82, 85, 34
A. L. R. 550, 555 (1924). Three recognized exceptions to the general
rule are: letters part of the res gestae, Murray v. East End Improve-
ment Co., 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1477, 60 S. W. 648, 650 (1901); letters
relating to an existing contract, Peninsular Naval Stores Co. v. Par-
rish, 13 Ga. App. 779, 80 S. E. 28 (1913); Ross v. Reynolds, 112 Me.
223, 91 Ati. 952 (1914); Sturtevant v. Wallack, 141 Mass. 119, 4 N. E.
615 (1886); and letters containing demand or notice, Morris v. Norton,
75 Fed. 912, 924 (C. C. A. 6th, 1896); Hays v. Morgan, 87 Ind. 231
(1882). The third exception is the most applicable to the principal
case, but the general qualification is that the letter can be admitted
only to show that demand or notice was given to addressee, and not
that the substantive matter of the letter has been admitted. Morris
v. Norton, 75 Fed. 912, 924, 925 (C. C. A. 6th, 1896). These letters
might be admitted by the court on the grounds that the plaintiff's
failure to answer was nonassertive conduct tending to show his ad-
mission of the matter contained therein, Falkner, Silence as Hearsay
(1940) 89 U. OP PA. L. REV. 192; ie., that there was a duty on his
part to answer the letters. Benn v. Forrest, 213 Fed. 763, 765, 766
(C. C. A. 1st, 1914).
An unequivocal general rule on this point seems impractical, and
precedent indicates that each case must be decided by its peculiar set
of facts. 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 1073 (3); Lord and
Spencer, Inc. v. M. N. Stout Co., 33 F. (2d) 60, 62 (C. C. A. 1st, 1929).
Strict adherence to the general rule, if such a rule can be claimed,
would perhaps indicate that the court improperly admitted the letters
in evidence, for the particular facts do not appear to be sufficient
to allow the admissibility of these letters under the general rule.
The court resolves this question, allowing admissibility, under
the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43 (a), 28 u. S. C. A. §§ 723 (b),
723 (c) (1938), which directs the federal courts to follow the rule,
whether state or federal, which favors admissibility.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ANOTHER JEHOVAH'S WITNESS CASE
The city of Opelika, Alabama, filed a complaint charging pe-
titioner with the violation of a licensing ordinance by selling books
without a license and with operating as a book agent without a license.
All licenses were subject to revocation at the discretion of the City
Commission with or without notice. Petitioner alleged that the un-
limited discretion in revocation of the license was an unconstitutional
encroachment upon freedom of the press. Lower court overruled this
contention and found petitioner guilty. Court of Appeals of Alabama
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reversed the conviction. Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the
Court of Appeals and stayed execution pending certiorari to the
Supreme Court of the United States. Held, affirmed. The tax stat-
ute is not invalid as abridging the freedom of speech, freedom of the
press or freedom of religion.1
The ordinance regulates the distribution of literature by use of
the taxing power. Until recently the taxing power could not be used
for police power purposes.3 It is doubtful, however, that the decision
in the Opelika case is justified under the implied extension of the
taxing power for police purposes for there is no indication that the pe-
titioners perpetrated a fraud, conducted themselves in an obnoxious
manner, created any disturbance or by the distribution of their liter-
ature committed acts injurious to public morals, or created a "clear
and present danger" 4 to organized society.5
The license and fees provided by the tax ordinance of the city
of Opelika bears no relationship to the danger which may be prohibited
by the exercise of police powers.6 While it is true the use of city
streets may be regulated in the public interests, no undue burden
may be placed upon the dissemination of information and the free
'Jones v. City of Opelika; Bowden v. City of Fort Worth; Tobin v.
Arizona; 62 S. Ct. 1231 (U.S. 1942).
2 The police power is the legal capacity of government to control the
personal liberty of individuals for the protection of the general
social interest. There are two requirements for a proper exercise
of the power: (1) There must be a social interest to be protected
which is more important than the social interest in personal lib-
erty and, (2) there must be proper means used to accomplish the
desired end. WILLIS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1936) 224, 728; Brown,
Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme Court (1927)
40 HARV. L. REV. 943.
3 Originally the taxing power could be so used. McCray v. United
States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (U.S.
1869); but in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Company, 259 U.S. 20(1922), the power was denied. In United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1 (1936) the court appears to approve a limited use of the
taxing power for police power purposes.
4There are three tests which have been used to determine when the
police power can be properly exrcised to control speech and press(1) when the words used directly urge or cause unlawful acts.
Masses Publishing Company v. Patten, 244 Fed. 535, 542 (S.D.N.Y.
1917); (2) When such words have an indirect or remote tendency
to cause such unlawful acts. Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S.
239 (1920); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); (3) When
there is a "clear and present danger" that the words used will
cause such unlawful acts. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919); see WILLIS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1936) c. 18.
5 See note 1, supra at 1246.
0 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 62 S. Ct. 920 (1942); In the instant case
the license fee was a flat fee of ten dollars a year for book agents
and five dollars a year for transient distributors of books. An
"issue fee" of fifty cents a license was also imposed. It is clear
that the purpose of the license was a suppression of the distribu-
tion of the literature for the tax was fixed in amount and was
measured neither by the extent of the petitioner's activities nor
by the amount which they received for and devoted to religious
purposes.
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exercise of the right of free speech under the guise of regulatory
taxation.7
Earlier the Supreme Court said that the right to act upon relig-
ious belief was subject to regulation but that the regulation could not
be exercised in a manner which would unduly infringe the protected
freedom.s This limitation seems to have been all but forgotten by
the majority in this and the Gobitis case.9 It justified Professor Ham-
ilton's criticism that Justice Frankfurter "discovered though he piled
up words to hide it that religious liberty is a local question."'o
The instant case likewise falls within the criticism of Mr. Chief
Justice Stone dissenting in the Gobitis case when he said "if we be-
lieve that such compulsion (flag-saluting) will contribute to national
unity, there are other ways to teach loyalty and patriotism which are
sources of national unity, than by compelling the pupil to affirm
that which he does not believe and by commanding a form of affirm-
ance which violates his religious convictions.""1 This statement might
be paraphrased in the instant case by observing that where a clear
and present danger to organized society is not involved it is unlikely
that the defendants or indeed the oppressed minorities of the world
will be encouraged to accept the value of our vaunted freedoms when
we hesitate to protect them ourselves.
As an exercise of police power it seems impossible to accept the
majority conclusion in the Opelika case.
HI
The exercise of police power over the freedom of speech has seri-
ous consequences in modern society. The pamphlet, a historic weapon
against oppression, is today, as ever, the convenient vehicle of those
with limited resources because newspaper space and radio time are
expensive and the cost of establishing such enterprises great.12 Free-
dom of speech and freedom of the press should not mean freedom
only for those who are economically competent to distribute their
broadsides.' 3 If the state may tax the privilege without limit it may
As the tax is fixed in amount and wholly unrelated to the extent of
the defendant's activities, it is a type of tax which when applied
to interstate commerce, has repeatedly been deemed unconstitu-
tional. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S.
33 (1940); Best v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454 (1940).
1 Cantwell v. Connecticut; 310 U.S. 296 (1940),
9 Minersville District v. Vobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 603 (1940).
20 The Supreme Court Today (1940) 103 wEW REPUBLIC 178, 180.
21 Minersville District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 603 (1940); see United
States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925); Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927).
22 Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938).
13 Pamphlets were extensively used in the struggle for religious freedom.
See GREENE, TH DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN CONNECTICUT(1905) 282, 283, 299 to 301.
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fix the rate of tax and through the tax, control or suppress the activity
which it taxes.14
The exercise without commercial motives, of the freedom of speech,
freedom of the press, or freedom of worship are not proper sources
of taxation for general revenue purposes. 15 Thus circulation taxes
for the purpose of revenue were held invalid prior to the adoption of
the First Amendment,16 and today, the distribution of pamphlets for
non-commercial purposes is protected from the restraint of censorship. T
The liberty of the press guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
which includes pamphlets and leaflets cannot be invadedi by the state.'
In the Grosjean case the court struck down as unconstitutional a
tax which was not measured by the volume of advertisements-its
.plain purpose being to penalize publishers and curtail circulation of
certain newspapers.' 9 Likewise, ordinances forbidding the dissemina-
tion of information are invalid.20 The flat license tax here involved, in
its potency as a restraint on publication, falls short only of outright
censorship. The more humble and needy the cause the more effective
is the suppression.2'
III
Important as free speech and a free press are to a- free govern-
ment and free citizenry, the right to worship according to one's own
dictates is ever more dear to many individuals. 22 The present or-
dinance infringes that right.23 In the Cantwell case a unanimous court
'4 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244, 245 (1936);
Magnana Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 45 (1934).
15 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
16 Stamp taxes for purely revenue purposes were successfully resisted
in Massachusetts in 1757 and again in 1785 on the ground that
they interfered with the freedom of the press. See DUNIWAY,
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN MASSACHUSETTS (1906) 119, 120, 136, 137.
" Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S.
444 (1938).
18 McConkey v. City of Fredericksburg, 179 Va. 556, 19 S. E. (2d)
682 (1942). However, new enterprises like the movies which give
entertainment but do not give expressions of opinion may be con-
trolled by censorship. Mutual Filn Corp. v. Industrial Commis-
sion of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915). In that radio gives entertain-
ment to that extent, but not when it presents expressions of opin-
ion, it would seem that censorship is legal. Caldwell, Censorship
of Radio Programs (1931) 1 J. OF RADIO L. 441.
19 Grosjean v. American Press, 297 U.S. 233 (1936). The statute
here imposed a two per cent (2%) license tax on the gross receipts
of any newspaper whatever having a circulation of more than
20,000 copies per week -for the privilege of enjoying such busi-
ness of selling advertisements whether printed or published. Lou-
isiana Acts 1934, n. 23, § 1.
20 Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Schneider v. State, 308
U.S. 147 (1939).
21 See note 1, supra, at 1245.
22 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). See LEE, HISTORY OF
THE METHODISTS (1810) 48.
23 The right of freedom of religion. and worship necessarily implies the
right to gain converts. While perhaps not so orthodox as the
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held invalid a law which required a license for the solicitation of
funds for religious purposes. 24
It is admitted that the immunity which press and religion enjoy
may be lost when they are united with other activities not immune,2 5
but the dissemination of ideas educational and religious, and the col-
lection of funds for the furtherance of those purposes are protected.26
Imposing taxes on the dissemination of ideas relating wholly to relig-
ious matters for which only a small fee is asked in an attempt to
gain converts had been held to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 27
These struggles for religious liberty have had a long history
culminating in the statements of policy in the Northwest Ordinance
of 1787,28 and the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution.2 9
Religious freedom must contemplate some freedom to act, otherwise
religious freedom is a meaningless term.30 The doctrine of the Gobitis
case which leaves control over such action to the legislatures, denies to
many political, religious, and racial minorities the protections on which
our democracy was founded.31 Such a doctrine is fraught with danger.
It is obvious that if the present taxes are sustained, a way has
been found for the effective suppression of speech and press despite
constitutional guarantees. Such were the moving causes of the Rev-
olutionary War. 2 Liberty of conscience is too full of meaning for
individuals in this nation to permit taxation to prohibit or impair the
spread of religious ideas, even though they are controversial and run
contra to the established notions of a community.33
IV
Assuming the validity of the substance of the ordinance the pro-
oral sermon, the use of religious books is an old recognized and
effective mode of worship and conversion. LEE, HISTORY OF THE
METHODISTS (1810) 48.
24 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
25 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 62 S. Ct. 920 (1942).
26 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 to 307 (1940); Schneider
v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
27 McConkey v. City of Fredericksburg, 179 Va. 556, 19 S. E. (2d)
682 (1942) ; State v. Greaves, 112 Vt. 222, 22 A. (2d) 497 (1941) ;
City of Blue Island v. Kozul, 379 ll. 511, 41 N. E. (2d) 515 (1942).
28 Art. I: "No person, demeaning himself in a peaceable and orderly
manner, shall ever be molested on account of his mode of worship
or religious sentiments, in said territories."
29 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. ....80 Fennell, The RecotnWted Court (1941) 19 N. Y. U. L Q. REV. 31.
8 1 WHIPPLE, OUR ANCIENT LIBERTIES (1927) 140 ff.
2See 2 MAY, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND (3d ed. 1882);
COBB, RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA (1902).
a Many of the "accepted" religions of today were looked upon as
fanatical and injurious less than a century ago. See, LITTLE, IM-
PRISONED PREACHERS AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (1938); LEE, HISTORY
OF THE METHODISTS (1810).
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cedure for the revocation of license issued under it condemns it as
unconstitutional.34
The license required by the Opelika ordinance was revocable at
the unrestrained and unreviewable descretion of the licensing com-
mission without cause and without notice or an opportunity to be
heard. Generally a license may not be revoked without notice or
hearing if the occupation or activity serves some useful purpose and
if the pursuit of such activity affords but slight opportunity for the
infliction of substantial injury to the public health, safety, morals or
convenience. 3 5
Thus the Opelika ordinance denies the petitioner procedural due
process because the petitioner's activities did not injure or threaten
to injure public health, safety or morals.3 6 The freedom of religion
which the constitution purports to safeguard cannot be subjected to
uncontrolled administrative action. Indeed the Supreme Court of the
United States has previously held that a license to be issued at the
sole discretion of municipal officers is void,87 because it makes en-
joyment of the freedom of the press contingent upon the uncontrolled
will of administrative officers. Nevertheless, in the instant case the
unrestricted power to revoke licenses was sustained. To say that
the withholding, at will and without cause, of a license is an exercise
prohibited by the constitution but that the revocation of a privilege
without cause and opportunity to be heard is a valid exercise of power
is an anomaly to say the least.
TAXATION
MULTIPLE TAXATION OF INTANGIBLESI
Testator died domiciled in New York. At the time of his death
he owned stock of a Utah corporation represented by stock certificates
in his possession in New York. Utah imposed a tax on the transfer
by death. Administrators of the estate filed suit, claiming this was
a violation of due process. Held, there is no constitutional immunity
from multiple taxation. The state of incorporation has jurisdiction
to tax transfer by death of shares of stock owned by a non-resident.'The decisions of the present Supreme Court are based on the
34 Notice and opportunity to be heard are generally required for the
refusal to grant a license. Bratton v. Chandler, 260 U.S. 110
(1922). The tribunal must be impartial. Tumey v. Ohio, 273
U.S. 510 (1927). These requirements apply to administrative as
well as judicial proceedings. Lloyd v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329 (1922);
Note (1934) 34 COL. L. nEV. 332.
So Note (1926) 4 wIs. L. RSV. 180, 186. Likewise there must be citation
before hearing and hearing or opportunity of being heard beforejudgment if private rights are involved.
ss z parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 513 (U.S. 1873).
s7Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
1Utah State Tax Comm. v. Aldrich, 62 S. Ct. 1008, 86 L. Ed. 911
(1942).
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